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The Importance of Information and Participation
Principles in Environmental Law in Brazil,
the United States and Beyond
David N. Cassuto and R6mulo S.R. Sampaio
This article explores the two different kinds of uncertainty, 'hard' uncertainty (unknown unknowns) and
'soft' uncertainty (known unknowns), in the context of
environmental law decision making. First, it is argued
that these different categories should not be treated the
same when facing decisions under uncertainty. To
deal with these different uncertainties, a tiered risk
analysis process is called for, wherein participatory
techniques are used both to turn hard uncertainty into
(more manageable) soft uncertainty as well as to
increase the legitimacy of environmental decision
making, even in cases of hard uncertainty. This methodology can and should apply to all instances of
domestic, transnational and international environmental law making. This article applies this conceptual platform to analyze how participatory techniques
can befactored in to manage uncertainty by reference
to two domestic systems - American and Brazilian
environmental law - as well as to international (environmental) law. The article concludes that managing
uncertainty in the environmental decision-making
process is a procedural justice tool to promote more
balanced and equitable outcomes.

INTRODUCTION
This article argues that participation is a key consideration in managing uncertainty in environmental policy
making. The main point is that participation - understood as access to environmental information, participation in environmental decision making and access to
justice - should be an important component of regulatory policies based on precaution. Indeed, whether considered as a principle or as an approach, the essence
of precaution is to deal with uncertainty. We divide
uncertainty into two distinct stages: 'hard' (unknown
unknowns) and 'soft' (known unknowns or 'risks')
uncertainty.' The term 'hard uncertainty' refers to cases
where the triggering event may be known but the probabilities of possible outcomes or even the outcomes
themselves cannot be predicted. The term 'soft uncer1 D.N. Cassuto and R.S.R. Sampaio, 'Keeping it Legal: Transboundary Management Challenges Facing Brazil and the Guarani', 36:5
Water International (2011), 661.

tainty' refers to circumstances where potentially negative outcomes and their probabilities can be predicted
and, therefore, measured. In such cases, risks can be
assessed. Consequently, soft uncertainty scenarios are
subject to cost -benefit analysis and can be addressed
through more rational and efficient policy-making processes, whereas instances of hard uncertainty cannot.
The impact of participation, in this context, is twofold.
First, participation is useful for gathering and disseminating information on a given issue (for purposes of risk
analysis, including 'risk assessment', 'risk management'
and 'risk communication'), which, in turn, can help
to move from 'hard uncertainty' to 'soft uncertainty'.
Second, even when hard uncertainty cannot be dissipated, participation remains an important procedural
justice tool to make decisions taken under uncertainty
more legitimate. Thus, participation is an important
component of the development and implementation of
environmental policies. Let us discuss this argument in
more detail.
The prevalence of uncertainty renders environmental
decision making - already a multifaceted and intricate
endeavour - even more complex. Uncertainty involves
both scientific and socioeconomic dimensions. From a
scientific perspective, environmental policy making
aims to rely on the best available information and the
best available technology - both of which vary widely
depending on region and circumstances. However, the
complexity of environmental decision making also
stems from the need to account for different social and
economic policies, interests and needs. These, too, vary
significantly across regions, countries and continents,
and are conditioned upon constitutions, treaties and
statutes that establish various priorities and levels of
risk aversion. It also bears emphasizing that risk assessment is inherently subjective and region-specific. Policy
decisions that have an impact on the environment can
never equally benefit all affected groups. They involve
tradeoffs or, in other words, they necessarily generate
social costs that must be allocated somewhere. Different groups and regions absorb different impacts; outcomes preferable to some will be anathema to others.
Environmental policy thus must accommodate human
choices that vary across communities and societies even
as it seeks to minimize global risk. Those two goals can
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sometimes be at variance. For example, while some
nations might be willing to accept the risks of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in light of the boost it
will provide to fbeir agricultural sectors, ofbers reject
such risks because fbey believe fbat the potential
dangers of GMOs outweigh any potential gains.'
Because of the many diverse views and perceptions
receiving input from many different variables, risk
communication - understood as fbe interactive
exchange of information from different stakeholders
before a risky decision' - is a crucial instrument in any
regulatory attempt to transition from hard to soft
uncertainty.
In order to assess fbe environmental and social costs
(and concomitant sustainability) of a particular policy,
fbe uncertainty it generates must be identified and
measured as accurately as possible. Environmental law
provides a variety of tools to do fbis, such as environmental impact assessments, regular monitoring, training and capacity building and, last but not least,
participation. These tools stem from an array of international declarations, conventions and treaties, as well
as from domestic constitutions, statutes, regulations,
and regional and local policies. Their primary objective
is to reduce 'asymmetric information' (i.e., to ensure
fbat relevant information is evenly diffused among
different stakeholders, thus serving as an active and
effective 'risk communication' strategy), and fbereby
facilitate rational and efficient policy making.
However, equal access to relevant information does not
mean equal allocation of risk. Risk management does
not necessarily facilitate equitable outcomes; rather it
enables procedural fairness. Procedural fairness, in
turn, is useful bofb in influencing decisions on fbe allocation of costs and benefits (risk management) and in
facilitating equitable outcomes (risk communication),
even when facing 'hard uncertainty'. Environmental
choices that acknowledge and allow for risks and fbat
weigh the impact of negative externalities may be
described as 'sustainable development'.4
2 K. Anderson and L.A. Jackson, 'Why are US and EU Policies toward
GMOs so Different?', 6:3 AgBioForum (2003), 95.
3 R. O'Rourke, 'EU Measures on the Safety of Food Imports from
Japan Following the Nuclear Accident at Fukushima', 3:1 European
Journal of Risk Regulation (2012), 81, referring to European Commission Regulation 178/2002 which defines risk communication as:
'[T]he interactive exchange of information and opinions throughout
the risk analysis process as regards hazards and risks, risk-related
factors and risk perceptions, among risk assessors, risk managers,
consumers, feed and food businesses, the academic community and
other interested parties, including the explanation of risk assessment
findings and the basis of risk management findings.' Regulation 1781
2002 of 28 January 2002 Laying Down the General Principles and
Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food Safety
Authority and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety,
[2002[ OJ L31/1, Arlicle 3.13.
4 This definition differs from the widely accepted version, which
defines 'sustainable development' as: '[A] process of change in which
the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orien-

IMPORTANCE OF INFORMA TlON AND PARTICIPA TlON PRINCIPLES

Complex policy decisions involving development aspirations, social needs and environmental objectives are
made amidst a conflicting set of asserted rights. For
example, fbe rights to development, a better quality of
life, and fbe preservation and conservation of ecosystems are often at loggerheads.' However, when affected
parties are well informed and fbe degree of asymmetric
information is low, risks are better managed and outcomes gain legitimacy. Even when a decision disfavours
some individuals, fbe chance to participate in fbe
decision-making process increases fbe opportunities
to influence fbe design of the policy. This leads to
a more legitimate and just outcome. Opportunities
for participation encompass more than formal legal
requirements. They serve also as risk analysis tools
encompassing fbe three prongs of risk assessment, risk
management and risk communication in contexts
where outcomes cannot be predicted wifb precision. 6
In what follows, we explore the implications of participation as a tool to deal wifb uncertainty in environmental policy making. Uncertainty is an inherent
component of environmental regulation. Its effects on
fbe policy-making process are significant. In some
cases, a genuine environmental problem is denied
or insufficiently tackled to the detriment of affected
parties and fbe natural environment. In ofber cases,
uncertainty adversely affects fbe efficiency and rationality of fbe process, particularly where unknown
unknowns are over-emphasized and 'crowd out' areas
where sufficient information is actually available and
where proper risk analysis could take place. In fbis
article, we argue for a tiered risk analysis process
wherein participatory techniques are used both to turn
hard uncertainty into (more manageable) soft uncertainty as well as to increase fbe legitimacy of environmental decision making, even in cases of hard
uncertainty. This methodology can and should apply to
all instances of domestic, transnational and international environmental law making.
To illustrate the proposed approach, we look at some
examples derived from Brazilian and United States law.
The selection of fbese two countries is based bofb on fbe
aufbors' familiarity wifb them and on fbeir contrasting
approaches to environmental decision making. We first
provide an overview of fbe role of uncertainty in envitation of technological development; and institutional change are all in
harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet
human needs and aspirations.' Our Common Future, Report of the
World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common
Future (UN Doc. Al42/427, 4 August 1987), Annex, at 54. However,
we believe that our version is more accurate and descriptive and in no
way contradicts the general understanding of the term.
5 R. De Giorgi, Direito, Democracia e Risco: Vinculos Com 0 Futuro
(Safe, 1998), aI191-192.
6 See R. O'Rourke, n. 3 above, at 81 ('[R]isk communication within
the risk analysis structure often plays second fiddle to risk assessments and risk management decisions').
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rOnIllentallaw making. We discuss the role of hard and
soft uncertainty in the risk analysis process and what it
portends for public policy 7 1his conceptual platform is
then used to analyze how participatory techniques can
be factored in to manage uncertainty by reference to
two dOlnestie systems - Alnerican and Brazilian hn'{ as well as lo inlernalional (environmenlal) law.

RISK AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Environmental law imposes regulatory demands that
create opportunilies through restraint. As already
noted, the nature of 'hard uncertainty' requires policy
makers to ad: in the face of unknmm unknowns (i.e.,
when the probability of the oUlcomes, or even the oulcomes themselves, are not known). 111is would render
rational and efficient policy making particularly challenging. It is, however, in this context that resorling to
palticipatory techniques may help to reduce the level of
uncertainty. Diffusing information among stakeholders
(Le., reducing the asymmetlY of informalion) would
enhance the level of awareness ofthe local stakeholders
with respect to a given problem. As they learn or
become more acutely aware, these stakeholders may be
led to share specific information that they may have on
the issue at hand and, thereby, contribute to the management of the problem. The key is to prompt the
sharing of such information and, as a regulator) to be
capable of taking it into account. Thus, making loc~l
stakeholders aware of a problem may be a useful step
towards reducing the scientific unceltainty surrounding the problem. Even in those c~ses where local knowledge has limited impact on the scientific understanding
of the problem, it is, in all events, imporlanl in connection \vith the llmnagelnent of the socioeconomic implications (risk management) and "ith the legitimacy of
regulatory action.
In the light of these observations, one can more easily
understand why participation is an important component of precaution. Precaution is about decision making
in a context of uncertainty.s If participation can guide
such a process, either by reducing uncertainty (its scientific and/ or socioeconomic dimensions) or by legitimizing the allocation of yet unknown costs and benefits,
lhen precaulion is also aboul participation. Significantly, precaution must not be equated with risk aversion. Rather, precaution would mean the ability to
handle unceltainty better and more confidenUy.' 11,e
B.M.J. van der Meulen et aI., 'Structural Precaution: The Application
of Premarket Approval Schemes in EU Food Legislation', 67:4 Food
and Drug Law Jouma! (2012), 453. at 454 (asserting that '[r]isk
analysis is a science-based methodology consisting of risk assessment, risk communication and risk management').
'~J.S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle', 27:1
William and Maw Environmental Law and Policy Reviel,1I (2002), 13.
9 There are instances where risk cannot be quantified and the precautionary approach does not function effectively. In these instances.
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dissemination of information entailed by this precautionary approach c~n, as a maUer of fact, lead to greater
tolerance of risk. As uncertainty is dissipated U,rough
the reduction of asymmetric information and the risks
are better understood, the latter may also be better tolerated on the basis of a more complete and shared
understanding of costs and benefits. By contrast, secretive treatment of information may lead to heightened
fear and intransigence, deter innovation and even
amplify potential harms.'" As discussed below, however,
the precautionary approach can also be (mis)applied in
ways that impede tlexibility and heighten risk. Thus,
depending on its application, the precautionary
approach ean translate into 1110re or less risk aversion.
The degree of risk tolerance may be expressed in terms
of the ratio of soft to hard unceltainty. When soft uncertainties (known unknowns) predominate, cosl-benefit
analyses gain coherence and risk analysis becomes a
tool for mitigating harm and alleviating concern.
Although uncertainty remains, the probability of pot entially negative outcomes is measurable. On the other
hand, in hard uncertainty scenarios, policy makers
cannot know what they ignore and must act ,,~thout
virtually any guidan(x, other than social perceptions. In
turn, this situation may result in a feedback loop that
diverts resources away fi'om risk analysis and toward
rearguard measures aime:d at safeguarding the stahlS
quo. In other words) precaution becomes severe risk
aversion. Inslead of examining the implications of a
situation, stakeholders tlY and think of comparable
examples. If an example comes readily, it ,,111 form the
basis for the social response even if statistically rare.
Thus, for instance, enonnous resources are devoted to
passenger inspections at airports although the risk of
terrorist infiltration is low and likely not substantially
affected by such measures. Meanwhile, little attenlion
or money goes toward securing luarithne ports, where
security is low and the comparative threat level much
higher. It is fear and not reason that guides action. This
tendency to focns on sources oflow risk but heightened
fear leads to what Kuran and Sunstein call an 'availability c..ascade', wherein the ensuing abundanc£ of information about the perceived risk makes it increasingly
difficult to obtain information about oU,er, more
serious threats." Those who doubt the perceived risk
scholars such as Daniel Farber have recommended the
'a-precautionary principle', which considers 'both the worst case and
best case scenarios, rather than focusing merely on uncertainty and
harmful outcomes'. D.A Farber, 'Uncertainty', 99:4 Georgetown Law
Joumai (2011), 901, at 905.
h'See generally C.R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law and
t!1e Envimnment (Cambridge University Press. 2004).
111. Kuran and C.R. Sunstein, 'Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation', 51:4 Stanford Law Review (1999), 683. Gillette and Krier
present a contrasting vision of the lay public's conception of risk,
arguing that for lay people, the model of risk is much richer because
they are concerned with risks that 'have catastrophic potential, that
are unfamiliar, uncontrollable, or involuntary, that threaten future
generations
that are distinctively threatening as opposed to

RECIEL 22 (1) 2013

IMPORTANCE OF INFORMA TlON AND PARTICIPA TiON PRINCiPLES

begin dou bting theillselves, thereby silencing an iInportant constituency whose opinions might lead to more
rational behaviour." The result of these linked phenomena is 'probability neglect' wherein powerful fedings of fear lead people to ignore probability and focus
instead on the worst case, irrespective of the greater
danger from other causes. 13 For eXaluple, ,\ve fear the
highly improbable plane crash more than the much
more likely possibility of a car accident. Probability
neglect diverts resources away from the most serious
d angers and concentrates them instead on palliating
social unease.14 The result is inereased hard uneerlainly, genera led by inefficient investment of resources
that could better be used to tackle existing soft uncertainty. This, in turn, feeds into greater probability
neglect. This bowdlerized precautionary approach
underlies much societal dysfunction and Inislnanage:ment of resources. Much of the problem relies on the
lilUe allenlion paid by policy makers lo risk communication strategies. That is due in part to the fad that
regulators, in general, 'are poor cOlnmunieators'.i5

Not all approaches to hard uncertainty are irrational,
however. Postponing projects or regulatory action until
widespread and shared by the general population, that are manmade
as opposed to natural'. C.P. Gillette and J.E. Krier, 'Risk, Courts and
Agencies', 138:4 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1990),
1027, at 1073. By this logic, the lay conception of risk is far more
complex and reflective of human nature. People tend to most fear
those risks that arise from human behaviour and yet lie beyond their
control. This presents a paradox wherein the actions of the government to regulate behaviour and thereby control risk actually create
the types of risk that the public most fears. See also D.rv1. Kahan,
'Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation', 156:3 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review (2008),741, at 743, which argues that
emotional response to risk is a necessary and beneficial part of risk
assessment and that attempting to 'shield law from the distorting
influence of emotion' is a serious policy error arising from a serious
error of perception. Kahan maintains that risk assessment is, or
should be, a values-driven enterprise and that omitting it from the
calculus ignores a key component of human reasoning and the
human condition.
I:' See C.R. Sunstein, n. 10 above, at 33-35,93-98.
13 Ibid., at x-xi.
1~ Ibid., at 51.
15 R.E. Lofstedt, 'Risk versus Hazard: How to Regulate in the 2F
Century', 2:2 European Journal of Risk Regulation (2011), 149, at
153, which notes that: '[A]part from anything else, [regulators] are
often too slow to communicate, because in many cases held back by
the vast bureaucratic machinery that makes up most government
departments. By being slow in their communication strategies officials
spend more time firefighting and engaging in reactive communications. The problem with this strategy is that reactive risk communication destroys public trust whereas proactive risk communication gains
public trust. This is complicated by the fact that many regulatory
bodies do not understand the importance of risk perception and staff
has not been trained in risk communication. They therefore often find
it difficult to convey clear and concise messages needed for the
modern media. To address this problem, regulators could either be
encouraged to participate in existing continuing education risk communication courses for professionals such as those developed by
Harvard University, or by developing customised risk-communication
and risk-analysis guidelines, something that the EFSA is presently
doing.'
@

information can be gathered and analyzed is in itself a
form of cost -benefit analysis. It posits that the benefits
of immediate action or regulation arc outweighed by
those gained through information gathering. The delays
created by such decisions C<ln involve significant social
costs. Indeed, critics of precaution point to the inertia
thal arises from unchecked informalion galhering as
e,idence of the unsoundness of the precautionary
approach and its sus<x'ptibility to misuse both by the
overly fearful and by those who intentionally fearmonger. 16 In such eircumstanc("s, an abundance of
caution - even in the absence of an availability cascade
- can lead lo decisions that defy sound management
strategies and foster ignorance. 17
Choosing one strategy or another (precaution as management versus precaution as fear) presupposes some
level of participation. But the role of participation in the
two cases is different. In the context of precaution as
management, participation intervenes in connection
'ivith risk assessment, risk management and risk communication, 'ivhereas in the context of precaution as
fear, participation may in fact crowd out risk analysis
and, at best, contribute an additional measure oflegitimacy to the measures taken (or the lack thereof).
Hmvever) Ule boundaries bet\veen the two conte..xts are
sometimes blurred. Ibrough analyzing examples taken
fr0111 the Brazilian and Al11erican domestic systems) we
endeavour to shed light on how to calibrate participation as a tool to manage uncertainty.

PARTICIPATION AS AN
UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT
TOOL: DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS
AB noted in the introduction, this section illustrates
the foregoing considerations by referencc to the Brazilian and American legal systems. Broadly speaking,
the latter is unjustifiably confident in the face of
uncertainty, whereas the former tends to be overeaulious. vVhile this generalizalion is overly broad
and not universally accurate, it is neveltheless useful
as it highlights the differen(x>s in the historieal
development of American and Brazilian environmental law.

~6 N. Oreskes and E.M. Conway, 'Challenging Knowledge: How
Climate Science Became a Victim of the Cold War", in: R.N. Proctor
and L. Schiebinger (eds.), Agnot%gy: The ivfaking and Unmaking of
Ignorance (Stanford University Press, 2008), 78 (discussing what
Hofstadter termed the 'paranoid style' in American politics).
'7 This is particularly true for what Farber terms 'fat tail risks'. See
D.A. Farber, n. 9 above, at 956. See generally C.R. Sunstein, n. 10
above.
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Historically, the American system has employed a reactive approach, operaling on the assumption that risk
can be successfully identified and quantified. This
approach displays a high degree of confidence in conventional risk analysis and a willingness to ignore
unquantifiable uncertainty. By contrast, Brazilian environmentallaw, which developed at the same lime as the
nation developed, evolved to face different challenges.
These differences underpin the divergent approaches to
11l1cRrtainty and participation taken by each system.

INFORMA TlON AND
PARTICIPA TlON IN US LA W
Environmental law in the United States looked to mitigate a lack of proper environmental risk analysis in the
past. Unlike Brazil, whose environmental legal regime
emerged as part of the nation's rapid development, the
United States was already industrialized and its population's basic needs already met when emironmental
laws CaIne to the fore.
As noted above, most emironmentallaws in the United
States do not acknowledge unknowable risks. For
example, although U,e National Environmenlal Policy
Act ('US NEPA')" calls for potential harms stemming
from agency actions to be assessed and discloscd/ 9 and
although the threat ofterrorism for nuclear facilities is
both obvious and potentially catastrophic, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission does not acknowledge the
lhreat of lerrorism in ils Environmenlal Impact Statements because such risks cannot be quantified."
Similarly, agencies also need not discuss worst case scenarios in their Environmental Impact Statements.
Instead, they must disclose potential information deficits that are relevant to 'reasonably foreseeable significant adverse hnpaets'.21 Perhaps an even starker
example is Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO
v. American Pelmleum Institute (Benzene Case), in
which the Supreme Court held that an agency could not
regulate a known c<1rcinogen unless it could conchlsively show through p~"isting data that the health risk
surpassed a quantifiable level."
Despite these limitations, the US NEPA has a strong
pmticipatory component. The first law of its kind in
the world, it not only introduced the importance of

w

Ibid., at §4332.
The Ninth Circuit rejected this reasoning in San Luis Obispo
Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regufato!y Comm'n, 449 F.3d 1016.
1032 (9th Cir. 2006). However. the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
has refused to change its policy. See DA Farber, n. 9 above. at
F!

909-910.
See D.A. Farber, n. 9 above, at 916 (citing 40 CFR §1502.22

(2009)).
n Indus. Union Dept AFL-CiO v. APi, 448 US 607. 614-615 (1980)
(plurality opinion).
@

exanllmng potential environmental impacts of proposed governmental activities, but also the ideas of
public participation and investigation of alternative
courses of action that could prevent or mitigate negative impacts before they occurred. In addition to mandating the use of Environmental Impact Statements, it
was also the firsl environmental law to explicitly incorporate the direct involvement of non-elected citizens
into the decision-making process. It infused anticipatory and precautionary planning into the earliest stages
of project development. The power of the information
thereby gleaned to galvanize public participation and
influence policy making has proven quile formidable.'"
Despite this predisposition loward data-driven risk
assessment, the precautionary approach is not entirely
absent Ji'om American environmental law. Courts have
consistently held that the Clean Air Act (CAAY'
requires the Environmental Protection Age11(Y (EPA) to
regulate pollutants even in the face of uncertainty as to
their potenlial harm. In Elhyl Corp. v. Environmental
i'rotectionAgency, the petitioner challenged the EPA's
decision to regulate lead emissions Ji'Olllmotor vehicles
in the absence of hard proof that they posed a threat.
The court rejected this challenge, noting that 'awaiting
certainty will often allow for only reactive, not preventative regulation' ," and that 'where existing methodology or research in a ne\v area of regulation is deficienl)
the agency necessarily enjoys broad discretion to formulate solutions on the basis of available information'.'" This deference to a precautionary approach to
air quality was confirmed in su bsequent cases. In
Whitman v. American Trucking Association,"! the
Supreme Courl confirmed lhallhe language of the CAA.
gives the EPA administrator broad discretion to safeguard public health. The law instructs the EPA to set air
quality standards 'the attainment and maintenance of
which ... are requisite to proted: the public health'. 'S It
further states that such standards must incorporate 'an
adequale margin of safety'." The respondenl challenged the EPA's methodology, arguing that cost COI1cerns should play a role in the setting of emission
standards. The court rejected this argument, holding
that the clear langu age of the statute requires the
administrator to focus solely on protecting the public
from hazardous eInissions. The statute's directive)
including building in an 'adequale margin of safety' was
found to be an intelligible principle through which to

42 USC §§4321-4347 (2012).

19
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23 D.N. Cassuto and J.A. Edgar, 'The Basics of NEPA and Its Role in
Combating Climate Change', in: R. Sampaio, G. Leal and A. Reis
(eds.), Topicos de Direito Ambienta/: 30 Anos da Po/rtica do ivfeio
Ambiente (Editora Lumen Press, 2012), 629.
"42 USC §§7401-7671 q (2012).
"Ethyl Corp. v. EPA. 541 F.2d 1 (DG Cir. 1976), at 25.
26 Ibid., at 27, n. 18.
Whitman v. Am. Tfllci<ing Ass'n. 531 US 457 (2001).

"42 USC §7409(b)(I) (2012).
" Ibid.
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guide the agency)s rule making. 30 Consequently, the
EPA must incorporate a degree of caution into its emission stand ards. Ihis type of precautionary approach is
to SOl118 exte:l1t presf':nt in other stahltes as \veIlY
Public participation can serve as either a boon or
impediment to the process of managing uncertainly in
the United States. For example, in the recent controversy over ground-level ozone regulation, public outcry
(and cilizenlawsuits) brought the Bush-era ozone standards under public scrutiny for failing to incorporate
lhe lalest scienlific knowledge. Vvl,en President Obama
took office in ,JanualY 2009, his EPA administrator
declared the regulations 'not legally defensible' under
the CAAY The Administration then persuaded the
plaintiffs to suspend their lawsuits pending the EPA's
issuance of new regulations. The next several years SR'i,'{
unremilting pressure bolh from cilizens' groups and
from industry. The citizen groups demanded the standards be strengthened due to increasing evidence
of public health threats posed by ozone. Regulatory
groups, on the other hand, argued that stricter standards were unnecessary in the face of the uncertain
nature of the public health threats and that increased
regulation would undermine the economy_ In September 2011, President Obama rejected the advice of his
EPA and kept the Bush-era standards in place, arguing
that his action would decrease regulatory uncertainty.33
The outcry was immediate and vociferous and the
litigation continues.
Ironically, public pressure brought the issue of ozone
regulation into focus but also created years of uncertainty and litigation as two presidential administrations sought to address both public health and
induslry pressures. TI,e CAA. requires fhe Administration to issue new standards in 201:3.34 It reluains to be
seen how the newly re-elected President will attempt
to meet his statutory obligations while also negotiating
the seemingly conflicting goals of protecting public
health and satisfying industry's demand for regulatory
predictabilily.
In sum, environmental law in the United States lacko; a
clear, defining principle with respect to risk analysis. It
tends toward a data-driven, reactive approach but also
Vllhitman, n. 27 above, at 474.
The 1996 Food Quality Protection Act. for example. requires that
for food to which infants and children are exposed, the EPA must set
pesticide levels at ten times the established margin of safety. See
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 7 USC § 136. See also the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 7 USC§136ff
and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 USC §2601ff.
v Letter from Administrator Lisa Jackson (13 July 2011), found at:
<http://www.eenews.netiassets/2011/07/14idocument_Qw_03. pdf>.
33 White House, Statement by the President on the Ozone National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (2 September 2011), found at: <httpJ!
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-officei2 0 11 i09 1021 state men tpr esi de nt-ozon e-n ati on al-amb ie nt-ai r-qual i ty-standards > .
0~ Ibid. See also <http:lh.v\vw.epa.gov/glo/actions.html>.
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incorporates the precautionary approach in various
instances. Like the Brazilian system discussed below,
the i\merican legal regime is constrained by an inability
to adjust to information deficits. It also often utilizes a
rigid risk assessment mechanism that is vulnerable to
hard un(x,rtainty. That vulnerability stems in part from
poor application of both the precaulionaty and datadriven approaches and in part Ji'om weaknesses in the
approaches themselves. While increased stakeholder
patticipation, access to information and effective risk
communication strategies will not resolve all these systemic flaws, they would significantly decrease avoidable
instances of hard uncertainty. For example, in lhe
aforementioned controversy over ozone standards,
public participation led to a re-examination of the scientific viability of the Administration's proposed standanls. Forcing the EPA to defend its position also
brought considerable new informalion to light and led
to increased scruliny of the agency's role as walchdog of
environmental and public health threats.

INFORMA TlON AND
PARTICIPA TlON IN THE
BRAZILIAN LEGAL REGIME
Brazil presents an example: of an emerging economic
power with an advanced environmental law regime that
continues to face significant structural challenges. Like
fhe Uniled Stales, Brazil is geographieallyvasl and eco10gic~lIy diverse. During the past two decades, Brazilian
law makers have stmggled to decrease inequality by
promoting development policies more evenly throughout rich and poor areas of the countty. To date, this goal
has been primarily accomplished tllrough policies such
as the 'Bolsa Farnilid;15 as ,,,,ell as by incentivizing the
agricultural and industrial sectors. During this SaIne
period, Brazil also significantly revised its environmentallaws and policies."
Against fhis backdrop, one can more easily understand
how diffenmt inten':sts, perspectives and even constihltional rights can collide. On the one hand, Brazil has an
enormous number of people who lack access to proper
education, sanitation and other basic needs. On the
other hand, groups of conservationists empowered by
the country's modern environnH.mtal hn\'s are advocating strongly for a stricter interpretation and enforcement of those laws. In this context, one may p~"pect
participation to playa very important role in connection wilh fhe allomlion of tile cosls and benefils of
For a description of the Bolsa Familia programme, see 'How to Get
Children Out of Jobs and Into School: The Limits of Brazil"s Much
Admired and Emulated Anti-Poverty Programme', The Economist (29
June 2010), found at: <http://www.economist.com/node/16690887>.
36 P.A.L. Machado (ed.), Direito Ambienta! Brasifeiro (Malheiros,
2011) (presenting a historical ovenriew of the Brazilian environmental. constitutional and regulatory history).
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environmental (or, conversely, developmental) policies
among different stakeholders as well as with the legitimization of such choices.
In theOlY, information and palticipation form a large
part of the Brazilian env~ronmental legal regimeY
Information and participation in environmental policy
making is guaranteed by the 1988 Constitution. Access
to information is guaranteed by Article 5 of the Constitution, which lists all fundamental rights, ineluding the
right to information)' TI,e Constitution also devotes a
whole chapler to environmenlal rights. Article 225
requires environmental impact assessments from all
pr'!iects with the potential to impact the emironment. 39
It further requires the govcrnnH.mt to prOlllote environmental education while mandating civil participation in
environmental decision making. TI,e 1981 National
Environmental Policy Act (Brazil NEPAl'o codifies
lhese conslitutional guidelines. In Article 9, the Brazil
NEPA lists the tools of environmental policy. Among
them is the national environmental information
system, which aggregates all relevant policy and
project-related information wifh environmental relevance 4 ' In addition to fhe Constitution and the Brazil
NEPA, tile Brazilian Congress enacted tile AceRss lo
Environmental Information Act in 200:3, which guarantces public ac(x>ss to information and data from cnvironmental authorities and agencies.'" More recently, in
2011, the: Free:dom of Information Lmv",vas enaded. 43
TIllS law) guaranteeing aec..ess to information retained
by any public agency or authority, c,on be seen as the
equivalent to the Freedom of Information Act in the
United States.
Following the Brazil NEPA, information and participation in fhe Brazilian legal framework divides into two
difIerent and equally imporlanl stages: public policy,
and project level. Within the list of available tools, the
Brazil NEPA employs two structural and fundamental
instruments of environmental policy: zoning and
environmental quality standards. With regard to development projects, the Brazil KEPA mandates environL. McAllister, Making Law Matter: Environmenta! Protection and
Lega! institutions in Brazil (Stanford University Press, 2008), at 178-

3;'

185.
Constitui y30 Federal de 1988, Article 5. (For an unofficial English
version of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, see 'Brazil: 1988 Constitution with 1 996 Reforms'. in Georgetown University Political Database of the Americas (last updated November 2008), found at:
<h Up: f/pd ba. george town. eduiConsti tuti on siBrazi II eng Iish96 .htm I> .)
:.,,1 Ibid., Article 225.
40 Lei No. 6,938, de 31 de agosto de 1981, found at: <http://www.
planalto.gov.brfccivil_03/leisfL6938.htm>. Article 9.
41 For the information principle under the Brazilian NEPA law,
see RS.R. Sampaio, 'A Importancia dos Princlpios da Informayao e
da Participayao em um Contexto de Decisao sob Incerteza', in:
R Sampaio, G. Leal and A. Reis, n. 23 above, 443.
~2Ibid .. at 443; Lei No. 10,650. de 16 de abril de 2003. found at:
<http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil ___ 03/Leis/2003/L10.650.htm> .
·,3 Lei No. 12,527, de 18 de Novembro de 2011, found at: <www.
planalto.gov.brfccivil_03/_at02011-2014f2011/IeifI12527.htm>.
38
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mental impact statements and environmental permits.
Information and parlicipation are embedded in all of
these pradiees.+1 Hmvever, in reality, these tools are
mere formalities and do not fulfil their objective. That is
to say, they do not serve as li.mdamental instruments of
procedural rights geared toward producing balanced
resulls. In other words, Brazilian policy makers are
failing to effectively implement one of the three core
pillars of risk analysis: risk cOlnmunieationY;
The Belo Monte Dam, a controversial dam project sited
in the Amazon, oft'.,rs a useful example of how these
tools get distorted in practice. Lack of strong, active and
representalive civil organizations,4 6 coupled with too
little space for pu blic pmticipation in strategic energy
investment decisions at the federal level/' created a
regulatory environment that favours big hydroelectric
power plants, including Belo Monte:'; Once a policy is
adopled, changing or lailoring il a l the projecl level
becomes impossible despite the statutory opportunities

44 Lei No. 6.938, de 31 de Agosto de 1981, found at: <http://www.
pi anal to. gov. briccivi 1___ 03 ILei si L69 38. h tm> .
45 M.G. Puder, 'The Rise of Regional Integration Law (RIL): Good
News to International Environmental Law (IEL)?', 23:2 Georgetown
international Environmentai Law Review (2012),165, at 189: 'Traditional risk analysis comprises the triad of assessment, management,
and communication. Risk assessment offers qualitative or quantitative risk estimation in light of data collected, documented, and evaluated in pursuance of scientific research and analysis. It moves from
hazard identification and hazard characterization to exposure
appraisal and risk characterization. Risk management then tackles
the task of constraining and reducing risk to levels deemed acceptable. In this stage, policy considerations enter the mix. Finally,
risk communication disseminates findings and measures to the
stakeholders.'
4(> Comissao Mundial sobre Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento,
Nosso Futuro Comum [Our Common Future] (FGV, 1988), at 46
(noting the insufficient levels of civil society organization in developing countries). See also D. Hunter, J. Salzman and D. Zaelke, international Environmental Law and Policy (Foundation Press, 2002), at

167.
Ministerio Minas e Energia, Plano Decenal de Expansao de
Energia 2020 (2011), found at: <http://www.mme.gov.br/mme/
galeriasiarquivos/noticias/2011 /SUMARIO-PDE2020.pdf>. The introductory note signed by the Minister of Mines and Energy thanks civil
society and all interested groups who participated in public hearings
concerning the plan, but the plan itself does not describe how participation helped and in which way comments were addressed and
incorporated into the final version presented to the public. Being such
an important requirement. information and participation should have
received a much more thorough treatment by the Brazilian Energy
Plan, describing selection process, disclosure of information, detailing comments received and how they were addressed so that those
tools can effectively work and reflect their role in such an important
policy making process.
,jR BBC
News Latin American and Caribbean, 'Work to Resume
on Brazil's Belo Monte Dam' (28 August 2012), found at: <http://
VIfININ.bbc.co .ukinews/world-latin-america-19404 740> (providing a
summary and overview of the legal battles fought in Brazilian courts.
including the Brazilian Supreme Court on different attempts from
different stakeholder for information and participation in the decisionmaking process concerning the Belo Monte Dam).
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for public participation. :"Iultipie interests and agendas
come into play and transform information and participation into purposeless rituals that lack any genuine
utility.
The dam project serves to illustrate the ongoing
unwillingness to make effective use of the information
arising from public participation. A more organized
and participatory civil society is a prerequisite for
more balanced and just projects. The challenge facing
Brazilian interest groups is not a lack of opportunity to
palticipate, but rather an entrenched unwillingness to
honour the inpul arising from U,al parlicipalion. As a
result, projects like Belo Monte proceed ,,~thout
adequately addressing public concerns. Changing the
culture of policy making to better utilize public participation will allow for better and more qualified participation at the project level. This shift could and
should lead lo a more coherenl nalional em~ronmen
tal polity that implements a virtuous circle of information and participation.
VVhat the Brazilian legal regime 'on the books' indicates
and what praclice illustrates is that despite the sophisliealion of Imvs concerning access to informalion and
the right to pmticipation, bridging the gap between
theory and reality is still necessary. Public knowledge
and participation are often restricted and, as a result,
procedural justice and legitimacy become compromised. Policy makers have yet to realize that information and participation are more than just formal
requirements in the law and must effectively include
civil society in the decision-making process. The Cnited
States example offers a different but equally cautionary
tale. The statutory regime is highly reactive even as the
opportunity for public participation is significant. If the
statutes allowed for greater acknowledgement of the
role of uncRrlainly in emironmental policy, the efficacy
of public pmticipation would be significantly enhanced.
As it is, hmvcvcr, reducing uncertainty remains an
elusive goal - one that is often impeded by regulatory
inflexibility.

INFORMA TlON AND
PARTICIPA TlON IN
INTERNA TlONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Parlicipalion and informalion principles are as important at fue intemationallevel as they are at the domestic
level. C nccrtainty regarding the long-term effects of
global environmental issues has allowed producers and
consumers of products with potential negative effects to
argue against taking corrective action until more informalion is known.'19 This has permilled multinational
Z.A. Smith, The Environmentai Policy Paradox: International Environmenta/ Management, 511 -, edn (Pearson, 2008), at 275-292.
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corporations to maximize profits by basing their business operations in locations with the least stringent
environnH.mtal Imvs.50 Participation principles at the
international level have beeomf,: inereasingly urgent
bec<luse of the lack of intergovernmental cooperation
to iInprove international enVir01llnental standards. 51
As noted in the introductory article lo this issue
of RECIEL, participatory techniques could provide a
means of (outsourcing' the pressure required for States
and companies to implement interna lional environmentallaw.c,2
Environmental participation was first introduced in
Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration'" and thereafter becmne \\'i.dcsprcad in international environmental
instmments.54 Many mullilateral environmental agreements follomng the Rio Declaration incorporated
similar participation principles." The 19% UNECE
Guidelines on Access to Environmenlal Deeisionmaking classified public participation as 'one of the
seven key clements for the long-term environmental
program for Europe l •56 These international mechanisms laid the frame:,work for the main instnlmf:':nt on
environmental participation - the Aarhus Convention/,,7 which propounded access to environmental
infonnation) publk participation in decision making
and environmental matters, and access to justice in
environmental matters.'" The public participation provisions have allmved citizens to aec(:ss (an international
venue where national options have been exhausted'.59

Ibid.
M. Dellinger. 'Ten Years of the Aarhus Convention: How Procedural Democracy is Paving the Way for Substantive Change in
National and International Law', 23:2 Colorado Joumal of International Environmental Law and Policy (2012), 309, at 315.
5~ See the contribution by Vifiuales in this issue.
,,3 Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration states: 'Environmental issues
are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the
relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held
by public authorities. including information on hazardous materials
and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate
in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage
public awareness and participation by making information widely
available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings,
including redress and remedy, shall be provided. Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development. found in Report of the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development. (UN Doc.
AlCONF,151!26 (Vol, I), 12 June 1992), at 10.'
b~ See M. Dellinger, n. 51 above.
5:· Ibid., at 318 (citing the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, and the Protocol on Water
and Health to the Convention on the Protection and Use of the
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes).
~G Ibid. at 319.
5i United Nations Economic Committee for Europe·s (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decisionmaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus,
Denmark, 25 June 1998; in force 8 October, 2009).
')3 <http://www.unece.org/envipp/contentofaarhus.html> .
C9 See M. Dellinger, n. 51 above, at 365.
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Additionally, the Aarhus Convention and other similar
international agreements demonstrate a gro. . . rJ.ng
awareness among countries that effectiveness of environmental principles at the international level must
hnprove.
\lVhile international agreements are iInpOltant, they
only reach the countries bound by them. Furthermore,
they are only as strong as the most reluctant pmticipant's threshold. International agreements also suffer
h'Olll a dearth of specific guidelines for providing access
to information and enabling public participation. The
Aarhus Convention demonstrates how multilateral
enVir0111nental agreements ean efficiently foster procedural rights such as the right to information, public
participalion and aCAOess to justice. It also illustrates
that conventions such as these are limited to those
countries that choose to be bound by them. As Vifiuales
and Chuffarl nole, the Aarhus Convention 'requires
State parties to introduce into their domestic legislation
three clusters of environmental procedural rights' (>0
Those rights are: information, public participation and
access to justice. Implementation often depends on the
enforcement mechanism set up by the Convention
under the coordination of a Compliance Committee."
The Aarhus Convention illustrates how effective multilateral environmental agreements can be in the promotion of procedural rights while also showing how the
scope of international law is often limited to developed
societies "ith greater levels of domestic political stability and a greater degree of civi.l society organization.6~~
By contrast, less developed countries face challenges in
adhering to international environmental agreements.
They often lack internal political stability and have
development priorities that do not allow for social or
environmental obstacles arising from information and
public participalion mechanisms. Those faclors, in
turn, have a negative iInpact on the effeetiveness of
J.E. Vinuales and S. Chuffart, From t!1e Other S!wre: Economic,
Socia! and Cultural Rights from an Intemationai Environmental Law
Perspective (Graduate Institute Geneva, Centre for International
Environmental Studies, 2011), at 13.
61 Ibid., stating that: 'The Aarhus Convention is interesting for our
analysis in a number of ways. First. the Convention obliges States to
implement what could be broadly referred to as 'transparency measures' or 'environmental democracy' measures. Thus States must
introduce into their domestic systems three clusters of environmental
procedural rights that allow civil society to put pressure on States
(and therefore, to some extent, to monitor them) in connection with
environmental policies and environment-related activities. Second.
where States fail to implement such measures, civil society groups
can bring a complaint before a compliance committee specifically
established by the Convention for this purpose.'
G2 For a list of signatory countries of the Aarhus Convention, see
United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice
in Environmental Matters, found at: <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src-TREATY &mtdsg __ no-XXVII-13&chapter-27 &
lang.:::en>.
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international law, particularly in the realm of procedural rights.
The RiO+20 summit exemplifies how an international
coni,",rencc, which initially was expeded to propel these
issues forward, fell short of providing any genuine guidane.!':,: or solutions. 6,,:\ As ]\forgera and Savaresi note)
despite the fact that 'green economy' comprised one of
the U,emes of U,e conference, the participanl countries
failed to even agree on a definition of the term, mueh
less a roadmap for its implementation. They did,
however, emphasize the need for inelusiveness and participation in the development of an evenhlal consensus
understanding of the term."4 And that agreement, while
modesl, embraces participation and informa lion
sharing and, if effectively implemented, eould significantly aid in future international negotialions.

CONCLUSION
Information and participation are instrumental to a
coherent precautionary approach. If the goal is to transmule hard uncertainly into sofluncerlainly and lhereby
enable competent risk analysis (including risk assessInent, risk management and risk eom111unieation),
eliminating aSymmetric- information is enlC-iaL Information gathering prior to adion or rnle making forms
the essence of risk analysis and the embodiment of the
precmrlionary principle. It enables just and equitable
outeomes by reducing aSY11llnetrie information, allowing for social accountability and providing procedural
justice. It thus makes the decision-making process
1110re legitimate.
Information gathering and public parlicipalion are
components of Brazilian and American national laws as
well as, Inore generally, of international conventions.
However, for a variety of reasons, such as national
development agendas, domestic political instability,
lack of binding international conventions promoting
procedural rights for developing countries, and reactive
legal systems to risks as opposed to prevention poliey
mechanisms in the American case (e.g., the US NEPA
nuclear lerrorism pJ{ample), participatory lechniques
are not fully effective. This, in turn, impairs effective
implementation of proactive risk communication
strategies. In Brazil, information and participation are
guaranteed by national law, but in practice they serve as
mere formal requirements rather than effective components of environmental decision making. In the Cnited
States, they are also part of the legal framework, but

83 F. Ullah, Rio+20: Dig Deep, Prepare to Act and Have Hope (Outreach, 2012), at 1.
84 See the contribution by Morgera and Savaresi in this issue.
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often in such a diluted form that uncertainty and risk
are ignored in the policy-making process.
In the international realm, information and palticipalion are built into major multilateral emironmental
agreements. However, the lack of multi-stakeholder
parlicipalion in inlernalional decision making and the
lack of progress in turning international procedural
laws into national and locally accountable commitments hamper the aforementioned benefits.
In sunl, genuine precaution - an acknowledged COlllmilmenl lo reducing hard uncertainty lhrough information gafhering and public participation thereby
leading to coherent and functional risk analysis - continues to be more of a grail than a genuine policy
initiative. The unwillingness of fhe international C0111munity to commit to comprehensive risk analysis is
parl of the reason why RiO+20 failed to generale any
signific.ant international agreement. This is due in large
part to the ongoing failure to adopt Ji.mctional risk
analysis policies at the domestic level. The United
States and Brazil offer useful examples of why such
failures persist. Each nation has its own unique reasons
for ineft("ctiveiy managing risk. The failure, however, is
global in scope.
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